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II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition. 
This Court should vacate the dismissal and remand with directions to appoint
counsel for the petitioner.
B. Procedural history
1.  The criminal proceedings
According to the Court of Appeals’ unpublished opinion:
On January 11, 2012, Detective Andreoli, an undercover narcotics
officer, arranged to purchase heroin from Steven McDaniel. McDaniel
and a friend identified as “Mikey” were to travel to Seattle to pick up
some high-quality heroin which McDaniel agreed to sell to Andreoli
upon their return. McDaniel kept in contact with Andreoli and delivery
was eventually scheduled for January 14.
On that morning Andreoli, with a surveillance team standing by, went
to a gas station on Federal Way in Boise where he met with McDaniel
for the heroin delivery. McDaniel, however, could not complete the sale
at the time because he stated Mikey had his digital scale. Unable to
purchase a new scale elsewhere, McDaniel decided they should drive to
Mikey's house and get his scale back. As they approached the house,
McDaniel had Andreoli stop the car so he could get out and walk the
remainder of the way, claiming Mikey did not want others to know
where he lived. The surveillance team observed McDaniel return from
one of two houses on the street. Upon his return, McDaniel directed
Andreoli to drive back to the gas station where he produced a digital
scale and completed the drug transaction.
During this time, the surveillance officers continued to observe the two
houses. A car, with its driver on the phone, pulled up and parked,
made a sudden and illegal U-turn and parked, then pulled forward and
parked again, all without signaling. Tappin exited one of the two
houses and got into the passenger seat of the car. As the car pulled
away from the curb, the officers made a traffic stop. As the stop began,
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officers observed the passenger lean forward and reach his hand
toward his waistband or pocket area. Officers removed the driver and
passenger from the vehicle and the passenger identified himself as
Tappin. An officer asked Tappin if he had any weapons or contraband
and for permission to search his person. Tappin granted consent and
the officers found a bag containing ten grams of heroin in Tappin's
right front pants pocket.
Tappin was charged with conspiracy to traffic in heroin, in violation of
I.C. §§ 37–2732B(a)(6)(C), 18–1701, 37–2732(b) and 19–304; trafficking
in heroin, I.C. § 37–2732B(a)(6) and 18–204; and possession of drug
paraphernalia, I.C. § 37–2734A. Tappin filed a motion to suppress the
evidence gathered by the police as a result of the traffic stop alleging
there was no legal basis for the stop and no reasonable suspicion of any
criminal activity. After a hearing on the motion, the district court
denied the suppression motion. Tappin entered into a conditional
guilty plea wherein he pled guilty to the trafficking charge and the
conspiracy and possession offenses were dismissed by the state. Tappin
reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his
suppression motion. Tappin appealed.
State v. Tappin, No. 40377, 2014 WL 546012, at *1 (Ct. App. 2014).
2.  The direct appeal
On appeal, appellate counsel argued “that the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to lawfully expand the length and scope of the traffic stop into
a drug investigation.”  Id., at *2.  The Court found that issue had not been
preserved for appeal, noting that:
Although he contested the initial traffic stop in the district court,
Tappin concedes on appeal that the stop of the vehicle and detention of
its occupants was valid. Tappin now asserts that his detention became
illegal and that illegality tainted his consent to search making it
ineffective.
. . . .
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After an evidentiary hearing, the district court entered factual findings and
ordered that Tappin’s motion be denied. The district court concluded that the
driver of the car made several traffic violations justifying the stop. The
district court further stated, “Once the stop occurred, nothing precluded the
officer from asking Tappin for his consent to a search. There is no challenge to
the fact that he voluntarily consented to the search of his person.” (Emphasis
added.) Although Tappin noted in his memorandum in support of his motion
that he “reserves the right to make additional arguments based on the
evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing,” no evidence was introduced
setting forth this challenge and no argument was made raising it to the
district court for a ruling on the issue.
Id.  Appellate counsel could not and did not challenge the district court’s findings
that Mr. Tappin had granted consent for the officer to search his person.  State v.
Tappin, supra.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress because 
Mr. Tappin’s trial counsel had not preserved the issue raised by appellate counsel. 
Id., at *3.
3.  The post-conviction proceedings
Mr. Tappin filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  R 4.  He
alleged that trial counsel was ineffective.  He alleged that trial counsel’s
performance during the suppression hearing was deficient because he failed to
challenge and preserve for appeal the issue of whether the scope and duration of the
traffic stop was unreasonable and also whether he had consented to the search of
his person.  In particular, trial counsel failed to call petitioner to the witness stand
to refute the state’s claims that: 1) the stop started out as a traffic stop; 2) the
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petitioner’s hands disappeared toward his waistband; 3) the petitioner voluntarily
consented to a search of his person.  R 2-3.
In support of the allegations, Mr. Tappin filed an affidavit wherein he stated
that, he should have been called to testify at the motion to suppress hearing to
dispute whether he consented to the search of his person.  He said:
4. My trial counsel, Mr. Randall Barnum, never called me as a witness
to testify on my own behalf.
5. This would have allowed me the opportunity to dispute the state[‘]s
claim that I had given them consent for a search of my person (6-18[-
]12 TR pgs. 79-80 LN 21-25, 1-2).
6. Based on this evidence alone, it seems clear that Judge Bail had
enough reason not to rule in favor of the Defendant/Petitioner.
7.  This is evident in Judge Bail’s decision to deny my Motion to
Suppress (see Motion to Suppress decision date 07-09-12 pg 4).
8. I had previously informed Mr. Barnum that I never consented to
search, and even requested that the audio of the arrest be obtained and
played in open court to support my claim of non-consent.
9. This would have proved that Det. Cory Bruner was lying about the
circumstances surrounding the illegal search and seizure that took
place, when he said under oath that Mr. Tappin consented to search
(TR pgs 79 & 80 Lns 21-25, 1-2).
Mr. Tappin continued that he should have been called to testify that the
police exceeded the permissible scope of the alleged traffic stop.  He said that:
10. Petitioner made it known to Mr. Barnum on several occasions both
before and during the suppression hearing that there was never a
routine “traffic stop” as the state leads the court to believe.
11. Det. Bruner never inquired of the occupants of the vehicle upon
stop[p]ing it.
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12. Det. Bruner even states during the suppression hearing that the
minor traffic violations were not the reason for the “traffic stop”
(6-18-12 TR pg. 119 Lns 9-12).
13. Mr. Barnum never called the Petitioner to the stand to give his
version of the traffic stop. Not only to refute the state[’]s version, but
also to get it on record.
14. Had the Petitioner been called to the stand, he would have told the
court the he was immediately pulled from the passenger seat at gun
point, patted down despite not giving consent, and arrested. There was
never any inquiry into traffic violations.
15. Being yanked aggressively from the vehicle at gun point is not
consistent with a traffic stop for minor violations.
16. Further, the State never provided any proof that the petitioner or
his co-defendant had engaged in any felonious behavior that justified
being pulled over in the manner described and removed from the
vehicle at gun point.
17. Petitioner asserts that the testimony from Det. Bruner concerning
the so called “traffic violations” was given merely a means to justify the
validity of the traffic stop, which was clearly treated as a felony stop.
18. Again, according to the State[’]s own witness (Det. Bruner) the
“traffic violations” were not the reason for the traffic stop (TR pg 119
lns 9-12). Had Petitioner been allowed to testify and provide his
version of the traffic stop, it would have eliminated this confusion
surrounding the traffic stop. I believe Judge Bail would not have
referenced these so called violations as justification for the stop in her
decision to deny Petitioner’s Motion to Suppress.
R 9-10.
Mr. Tappin also said he asked trial counsel to call him to testify so he could
dispute the testimony that he reached toward his waist. 
19. Petitioner made known to trial counsel that he never reached
“towards his waistband or pocket area” before being contacted by police
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and that he wished to dispute this claim made by the State (TR pgs
77-78 lns 21-25, 1-8).
20. Petitioner told his counsel, Randall Barnum[,] on many occasions
that he did not submit to a search and that he wished to obtain a copy
of the police audio recording made during the traffic stop and to play it
in court to support this claim. Petitioner advised counsel before and
during the suppression hearing that he was never moving his hands
and that he was pulled from the vehicle at gun point unnecessarily.
21. However, counsel never raised these issues, or Petitioner’s version
of the events of the arrest during the suppression hearing. Nor did he
obtain a copy of the police audio recording. Instead he told me we don't
need to, we are going to beat this thing.”
22. By not calling me to the stand, he allowed only the State’s version
of events to be a part of the official record, which is the reference the
Judge used to make the decision to deny Petitioner’s Motion to
Suppress.
R 10-11.
Mr. Tappin asked the court to appoint counsel. R 23-25.  The court denied the
motion on May 13, 2014.  The Order read, in relevant part, as follows:
The file will be reviewed to determine if there is a basis for
post-conviction relief.  If the petition is not subject to summary
dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), counsel will be appointed. If
the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim,
counsel will be appointed.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P .3d 798, 809 (2007).  The Court will consider whether the facts
alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would
be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the
claims.” Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007).
At this point, the motion is denied.
R 28.
The state filed an Answer.  R 38-41.  It did not move for summary disposition
of the petition.
 A Motion to Take Judicial Notice of these documents has been filed.1
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On November 10, 2014, Mr. Tappin filed a second Motion and Affidavit in
Support for Appointment of Counsel.  R 46-48.  Mr. Tappin argued that he had met
the burden of demonstrating a potentially valid claim under I.C. §19-4904, stating
that he was “afraid the court may be abusing its discretion if the court is denying
counsel on the merits of the post-conviction which was prepared pro-se.”  R 50,
citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004).  Mr.
Tappin stated that he only had a ninth grade education, worked in the electrical
trade, and had no legal experience.  Accordingly, “my petition may be conclusory
and/or incomplete, and gives further merit to my request for appropriate counsel.” R
50.  Mr. Tappin concluded that he had “raised viable claims to further be addressed
and the court should appoint counsel in order to give me ample opportunity not only
to work with counsel, but to also properly allege the necessary supporting facts.”  He
also stated that, “I believe that had I adequate means to do so, I would seek out and
retain counsel to further conduct research into said claim(s).” Id.
The Court took judicial notice of the Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Suppress, the transcript of the suppression hearing, and the Order Re:
Motion to Suppress from the criminal case.  R 52.1
On February 5, 2015, the court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.  R 53.  Mr.
Tappin did not file a response to the Notice.  The court dismissed the petition and
entered a Final Judgment, but never ruled on Mr. Tappin’s second motion for
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appointment of counsel.  R 71-72.
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed.  R 85.  The court granted Mr. Tappin’s
Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender.  R 89.
III.  ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Tappin’s motion for
appointment of counsel since the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a
valid claim?  
IV.  ARGUMENT
“A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”  Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317, 372 P.3d
372, 380 (2016), reh'g denied (2016); Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 393, 327 P.3d
365, 369 (2014).  When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal,
the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower
court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho
Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
“A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is
governed by I.C. § 19–4904, which provides that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a
court-appointed attorney ‘may be made available’ to an applicant who is unable to
9
pay the costs of representation.” Shackelford, at 392–393, 327 P.3d at 368–369
(quoting I.C. § 19–4904). “The standard for determining whether to appoint counsel
for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition
alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.” Id. at 393, 327 P.3d at 369
(citing Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007)). “In
determining whether the appointment of counsel would be appropriate, every
inference must run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at
that time and cannot be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary
facts.” Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 342, 223 P.3d 281, 284 (2009) (quotation
marks omitted). 
Here, it is unclear whether the district court identified the correct legal
standard.  It first stated that “[i]f the petition is not subject to summary dismissal
pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b), counsel will be appointed.”  R 28.  That, however, is
not the standard for deciding whether to appoint counsel.  In the next sentence, it
cited the standard as set forth in Shackelford.  Id.  In the sentence after that, it said,
“[t]he Court will consider whether the facts alleged are such that a reasonable
person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further
investigation into the claims,” citing Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.2d
12, 15 (2007).  Id.  Thus, only two of the three standards set forth by the district
court are correct.   
Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether the court applied the correct
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standard.  In its penultimate sentence, the Court stated, without any analysis,  “At
this point, the motion is denied.” R 28.  The court did not find the facts required to
deny appointed counsel irrespective of which standard is applied.  It did not find that
the petition was subject to summary disposition.  (That occurred later, after the
motion to appoint counsel had been denied.)  It did not find that the petition failed to
allege facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.  And it did not find that the facts
alleged were such that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be
willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims.  Thus, in
addition to not setting forth the correct legal standard, the court abused its
discretion because it did not act consistently with the correct standard and because it
did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.  
Mr. Tappin notes that the “at this time” language suggests that the court
intended to review the allegations sometime in the future and appoint counsel if it
found the pleading sufficient.  If that is the case, the court must have applied the
incorrect first standard it identified because the only finding it made was that “[t]he
petitioner has failed to meet his burden under the Strickland test in his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.”  R 64.  That was error because the petitioner does not
need to make s prima facie showing of a cause of action to be entitled to appointment
of counsel.  He only needs to allege facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.
Showing the possibility of a valid claim is a decidedly lower threshold than
establishing a genuine issue of material fact.  “The determination whether to appoint
counsel and the determination whether a petition is subject to summary dismissal
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are thus controlled by quite different standards, with the threshold showing that is
necessary in order to gain appointment of counsel being considerably lower than that
which is necessary to avoid summary dismissal of a petition.”  Judd v. State, 148
Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2009).
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both that her attorney's performance
was deficient, and that she was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the criminal
charge. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To show deficient
performance, a petitioner must demonstrate “that counsel’s representation did not
meet objective standards of competence.” Id., at 687-688.  If a petitioner succeeds in
establishing that counsel’s performance was deficient, he must also prove the
prejudice element by showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id., 466 U.S. at 694. As shown above, Mr. Tappin alleged facts showing
the possibility of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. 
Mr. Tappin alleged that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not
challenge the scope of the seizure.  Mr. Tappin alleged that he could have been called
to testify that “there was never a routine ‘traffic stop’ as the state [led] the court to
believe.”  R 10.  And, “Det. Bruner never inquired of the occupants of the vehicle
upon stop[p]ing it.”  Id.  Mr. Tappin could have testified that “he was immediately
pulled from the passenger seat at gun point, patted down despite not giving consent,
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and arrested. There was never any inquiry into traffic violations.”  Id.  Had the
district court found the scope of the traffic stop had been exceeded it would have
suppressed the evidence found in the search.  See, State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647,
651-53 (Ct. App. 2002) (Unlawful for an officer to question a driver about matters
unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer fulfilled the purpose of the traffic stop by
issuing a written warning to the driver.); State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 564 (Ct.
App. 2005) (where the officers abandoned the investigation into the traffic offense to
pursue a drug investigation that was not supported by reasonable suspicion). 
However, “Mr. Barnum never called the Petitioner to the stand to give his version of
the traffic stop. Not only to refute the state[‘]s version, but also to get it on record.” 
R 10.  As Mr. Tappin observes, even if the district court denied the motion, the issue
regarding the scope of the stop would still have been preserved for appeal.
Further, Mr. Tappin could have testified that he never leaned forward and
reached his hand toward his waistband or pocket area, a fact which could have been
used to justify a pat down for weapons.  See, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
“Petitioner made known to trial counsel that he never reached ‘towards his
waistband or pocket area’ before being contacted by police and that he wished to
dispute this claim made by the State.”  R 10.
Third, Mr. Tappin could have testified that he did not consent to the search. 
“I had previously informed Mr. Barnum that I never consented to search, and even
requested that the audio of the arrest be obtained and played in open court to
  After judgment was entered, Mr. Tappin filed an I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. 2
Aug. p. 1.  In that motion, he states he never heard the police audio recordings until
after August of 2015, five months after the post-conviction petition was dismissed. 
Mr. Tappin discovered that the police did not record the contact with the vehicle and
thus there is no recording of any facts justifying the scope of the stop to be expanded
from a traffic stop to an investigatory stop.  There is also no recording of the consent
to search the police claimed that he gave.  Aug. p. 3.  
 In light of Terry, the district court’s observation that “once validly stopped, a3
search of [Mr. Tappin’s] person for officer safety reasons would have been standard”
is dead wrong.  R 63.  A Terry search for weapons must be supported by articulable
facts and is not permitted as standard operating procedure.
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support my claim of non-consent.”  R 10.   Absent consent, Mr. Tappin could not have2
been searched because there was no reason to believe that he was armed.  Absent
consent, an officer may frisk an individual only if the officer can point to specific and
articulable facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the
individual with whom the officer is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous
and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel this belief.”  Terry,
392 U.S. at 27.   Additionally, even if a frisk is permitted under Terry, the scope of a3
frisk must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.  There was
nothing about the baggie discovered in the search which could have led the officer to
believe it was a weapon. 
Thus, Mr. Tappin has alleged facts which show that he could have called into
dispute the facts which led to the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and
that his attorney was aware that he could testify to those facts.  These facts are
sufficient to show the possibility of a valid claim and merit appointment of counsel
  There is no obvious strategic reason for trial counsel to fail to argue4
additional bases in support of his motion to suppress.  A challenge to the scope of
the stop and the absence of consent/articulable basis to search Mr. Tappin would
not have been inconsistent with trial counsel’s argument that there was no basis for
a traffic stop.  There is also no obvious reason why Mr. Tappin should not have
testified in support of the additional bases as his testimony at the suppression
hearing would not have been admissible at trial in the state’s case in chief. 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).      
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under Shackelford, supra.
Finally, the facts alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the
claims.  Counsel might have been able to obtain the affidavit of the co-defendant,
who was driving the vehicle.  He also might have been able to obtain an affidavit
from trial counsel stating that he did not have a strategic reason to fail to challenge
the scope of the stop or whether the search of Mr. Tappin was justified by consent or
articulable facts.4
Had the evidence been suppressed, the state would have had to dismiss the
Trafficking in Heroin charge and the conspiracy charge would have been much more
difficult, if not impossible, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  A reasonable person
at trial would focus their resources on the motion to suppress because it was the key
to the defense strategy.  Likewise, on post-conviction a reasonable person would
devote resources to investigate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim which could
lead to the eventual suppression of the most important evidence in the state’s case. 




The district court abused its discretion in not appointing counsel to assist Mr.
Tappin with his post-conviction petition.  For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Tappin
asks this Court to vacate the summary dismissal of the petition and remand the
matter for appointment of counsel and further proceedings.  
Respectfully submitted this 24  day of August, 2016.th
____/s/_____________________
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Michael Tappin
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